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Abstract: Van Gelder’s specification of the dynamical hypothesis does not
improve on previous notions. All three key attributes of dynamical systems
apply to Turing machines and are hence too general. However, when a
more restricted definition of a dynamical system is adopted, it becomes
clear that the dynamical hypothesis is too underspecified to constitute an
interesting cognitive claim.
Van Gelder claims that the dynamical hypothesis entails three key
properties, but all three properties apply to Turing machines, the
paradigmatic nondynamical system.
1. Quantitative in state. “A system is quantitative in state when
there is a metric over the state set such that behavior is systemat-
ically related to distances as measured by that metric” (sect. 3.3,
para. 3).
This is true of a Turing machine. Define the following metric:
the distance between two states is the minimal number of steps
between them. The behavior of the Turing machine systematically
relates to this metric (at each step, the machine will step to a
neighboring state in this metric). This does not, of course, imply
that all neighboring states are equally accessible, but this holds
true for dynamical systems as well, where one cannot, for instance,
simply reverse the direction of time.
2. Quantitative state/time interdependence. “A system is
quantitative in time when time is a quantity; that is, there is a met-
ric over the time set such that system behavior is systemically re-
lated to distances as measured by that metric . . . amounts of
change in state are systematically related to amounts of elapsed
time” (sect. 3.3, para. 5).
This is also true of a Turing machine. The standard metric over
discrete times (such that the distance between t 5 m and t 5 n
is un 2 mu). Plus the distance metric over space just mentioned will
suffice. System behavior is again systematically related to time in
this sense. Also, this metric is neither trivial, nor only occasionally
or accidentally related to system behavior. Contrary to van
Gelder’s claims, the notion of computation embodied by Turing
machines has central interest in the time course of computation:
computational complexity theory (Garey & Johnson 1979) is a fun-
damental topic in computer science. Algorithms are evaluated not
only in terms of effectiveness, but also in terms of efficiency; that
is, questions are standardly evaluated not only in terms of com-
putability but also in terms of tractability. This concern naturally
carries through to computational accounts of cognition (e.g.,
Falkenhainer & Forbus 1989). Furthermore, within the frame-
work of the computational hypothesis, there are models that have
sought specifically to capture the time course of human behavior.
Recent examples of this are Anderson and Matessa’s (1997)
production-rule system of serial memory, which seeks to model
latencies or the careful evaluations of competing models of anal-
ogy with respect to response time predictions by Keane et al.
(1994).
3. Rate dependence. “Rates of change depend on current rates
of change” (sect. 3.3, para. 6). As stated, this is a tautology, because
it is not clear what separates “rates of change” from “current rates
of change.”
Van Gelder elaborates: “In these systems, variables include
both basic variables and the rates of change of those variables”
(sect. 3.3, para. 6). This seems completely mysterious, because we
are given no analysis of what it is for a system to include a variable.
Van Gelder does note that “a variable is simply some entity that
can change. . . . The state of the system is simply the state or value
of all its variables at a time” (sect. 3.1, para. 1). From this it seems
that state is just defined extensionally in terms of an arbitrary set
of variables. If so, given any concrete object, we can define a sys-
tem by a set of variables associated with that object and then de-
fine a new system including these variables and their rates of
change. The latter system will be dynamical, according to the cri-
terion of rate dependence. For any concrete object whatever (in-
cluding the brain), at any level of analysis whatever, it seems that
we can trivially satisfy the third criterion just by adding additional
variables by fiat. So we seem to be no further forward.
What alternative analysis might be more appropriate? Van
Gelder’s Table 1 gives seven previous definitions of dynamical sys-
tems. Of these, 1 and 2 are tied directly to their physical realiza-
tion, and hence not relevant in this more general context, whereas
5, 6, and 7 are trivially satisfied by Turing machines (essentially be-
cause Turing machines evolve deterministically over time).
However, consider definition 3 that a dynamical system is “a
smooth manifold together with a vector field” (Casti 1993). Be-
cause this definition requires that the state space be smooth, the
Turing machine is ruled out, because it has a discrete state space.
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In brief, definition 4 states that dynamical systems are continuous
deterministic systems, but once we realize that this is the funda-
mental claim, then it is clear that the dynamical hypothesis is sim-
ply too underspecified to be of any interest.
The computational hypothesis does not merely say that the
mind is discrete at a high level of analysis. Instead, it applies a the-
ory of symbolic computation of enormous theoretical richness and
practical power. However, the dynamical hypothesis does merely
state that the system is continuous – it says nothing about how it
works, aside from the trivial truth that it should be studied using
the diverse tools of dynamical systems theory. In short, the dy-
namical hypothesis has the same status that a putative “discrete
hypothesis” concerning the mind would have had before Turing,
von Neumann, and development of digital, symbolic computation:
that is, it would be almost completely devoid of substance.
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